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Shackle on Time, Uncertainty and Process 
 
Introduction 
Contributions to heterodox economics have long made use of the idea of ‘process’ to 
provide an analytical lens through which to understand the history of economic 
thought (e.g. Nelson 2003), and as an essential element of the alternative ontology 
that the different heterodox schools of thought could be said to share (Lawson 2006; 
2012). Institutionalist, feminist, post Keynesian or Austrian approaches are described 
as ‘processual’, or as relying on the ontological assumption that the social world is 
‘dynamic’ and ‘exists in a continual state of becoming’ (Lawson 2006: 495). This 
description of what is claimed to be a unifying characteristic of the heterodoxy is 
readily connected to evolutionary or old institutionalist theories. Indeed, it is an 
attractive and intuitively plausible descriptor for the emphasis on dynamic change 
that these approaches share. However, part of the appeal of process theory in the 
heterodox literature comes from its highly abstract and general formulation and 
further conceptual work is necessary to enable a more consistent, though perhaps 
more restricted, usage of the term. 
 This paper is intended both as a contribution to the conceptual work on 
process in economic thought, and as an attempt to connect a non-institutionalist, 
non-evolutionary thinker to it. As such, the paper has two purposes:  
1. To delineate a broad, philosophically grounded conception of what an 
economic process theory (EPT) is. 
2. To locate the contributions of George Shackle within this broad conception of 
EPT. 
My primary objective is to provide a framework that can be used by others to study 
process theories within economics and to apply it to a difficult case at the boundary 
of what might previously have been considered processual economics. A secondary 
ambition is to draw out the originality and significance of Shackle’s approach with a 
particular emphasis on areas where he offers a different perspective to process 
conceptions developed within other traditions such as institutional and evolutionary 
economics. Reading Shackle as an economic process theorist in my sense is, I will 
argue, a resource for those wishing to defend his ideas against a number of critical 
arguments. 
The paper is divided into three parts. Part I sketches the history of Western 
process thinking and summarises its key characteristics in order to distil four key 
desiderata for an EPT from them. Part II provides a brief description of Shackle’s 
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economics, with a special emphasis on his conceptions of time and uncertainty. I 
claim that Shackle’s treatment of these two key concepts marks him out as a 
significant modern proponent of EPT. Part III describes the reception of Shackle’s 
work, the allegations of analytical nihilism and the perceived problem of social order. 
I claim that these critiques lose much of their force when his contribution is 
understood as a process theory. 
 
Part I 
Process Philosophy 
Philosophical research – from which many of the processual ideas adopted by 
heterodox economists originate – is as plausible place as any to seek a more precise 
conception of what a process theory is, and that is what I now propose to do. 
Process philosophy is concerned with the study of the nature of being and 
thus is considered to be part of the broader sub-discipline of ontology. It can be 
contrasted with, and is often constructed in direct opposition to, ‘substance 
metaphysics’ – the mainstream view of ontology in Western philosophy – which 
claims that the ‘stuff’ of being is internally undifferentiated and static. According to 
this view, a singular unchanging substance undergirds our experience of the world 
and the task of ontology is to investigate it. Process philosophy’s main objective, 
then, is to undermine the substance view and its attendant conception of entities, 
and to construct an alternative ontology that takes process as its basic building block. 
Western process thought is usually traced to the writings of Heraclitus and 
Leibniz but most modern variants can be connected to at least one of two 
philosophical traditions: continental philosophy and American pragmatism. 
European process thought arose out of German idealism, in particular Fichte, Hegel 
and Schelling’s criticism of Kant. It assumes that philosophical enquiry can be 
speculative in the sense that the process of reality follows principles that are open to 
philosophical (rather than empirical) investigation. Arising, as it did, from idealism, it 
is no surprise that this approach privileges the study of the process of human 
cognition with a focus on the subjective experiences of the thinker. Most 
importantly, this continental tradition does not draw a close connection between 
process philosophy and the study of concrete processes such as might be found in 
the natural and social sciences. This gulf between ontological reflection and scientific 
practice was not reproduced in the work of Anglo-Saxon process philosophers, many 
of whom started from similar premises. 
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Hegel’s ideas about process inspired a different tradition in the United States 
that grew out of the philosophical and social-psychological research of John Dewey 
and William James. Dewey’s philosophical perspective has been the most influential 
within the social sciences1. He argued that the study of ontology does not involve 
projecting the individual mind out onto an unknown reality. Instead, the mind itself 
emerges from the continuous flow of interactions between organisms and their 
environment. Dewey’s most basic ontological claim is that reality is made up of 
events rather than substances. These events are episodic in the sense of having a 
unique qualitative feel. However they are also part of broader structured patterns 
that are the target of scientific study. According to Dewey, events (possessing this 
dual character) are also conditioned by the nature of ontological enquiry, which is 
itself a social, linguistic activity carried out collectively. Within pragmatism, social 
interaction is not a mystery to be explained, but a constitutive component of the 
mind and a crucial target of both scientific and philosophical inquiry. This is 
significant, because it placed the ontology of process in the public realm, thus 
making it amenable to (indirect) empirical study by sociologists and psychologists 
(e.g. Mead 1934). This empirical turn seems to be the key to understanding much of 
modern process thought in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, which has moved away from 
speculative pursuits and sought closer connections with the natural and social 
sciences. 
Arguing from the within the empiricist, analytical tradition of Western 
philosophy, which is dominated by substance metaphysics, Nicholas Rescher (1996, 
2000) has elaborated and defended a comprehensive process philosophy. His 
approach incorporates ideas from both historical traditions, whilst maintaining 
intellectual proximity and an open dialogue with mainstream philosophy of science. 
Like the pragmatists, Rescher is concerned to relate the ontological insights of 
process philosophy to empirical phenomena, and in particular to the natural sciences. 
Both the stated ambitions and the influence of Rescher’s contribution within the 
philosophical literature, suggest that his work can provide a good foundation for 
extending a systematic process philosophy into economics. Rescher’s perspective is 
best understood by quoting him at length: 
‘…process philosophy” may be understood as a doctrine committed to, or at any rate 
inclined toward, certain basic propositions:  
(1) Time and change are among the principal categories of metaphysical 
understanding.  
                                                          
1 Institutional economics, in particular, owes a significant intellectual debt to Dewey. 
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(2) Process is a principal category of ontological description.  
(3) Processes are more fundamental, or at any rate not less fundamental, than things 
for the purposes of ontological theory.  
(4) Several if not all of the major elements of the ontological repertoire (God, nature-
as-a whole, persons, material substances) are best understood in process linked 
terms.  
(5) Contingency, emergence, novelty, and creativity are among the fundamental 
categories of metaphysical understanding.  
A process philosopher, accordingly, is someone for whom temporality, activity, and 
change — of alteration, striving, passage, and novelty emergence — are the cardinal 
factors for our understanding of the real’. (Rescher 2000: 5). 
Of course, this definition depends crucially on what we understand a process to 
be – a potentially thorny problem. Rescher defines a process as ‘an actual or possible 
occurrence that consists of an integrated series of connected developments 
unfolding in programmatic coordination: an orchestrated series of occurrences that 
are systematically linked to one another either causally or functionally’ (Rescher 
2000: 22). He articulates this further by proposing three distinctive features or 
‘pivotal facts’ about process: 
1. A process is a complex of distinct phases. 
2. A process has a temporal dimension (time is essential to it). 
3. A process has a generic structure in virtue of which any concrete process is 
shaped or formatted.  
 In summary, despite historical divergences and differing views on the 
connection between philosophy and empirical research, process philosophy can be 
seen as a coherent ontological perspective (at least at an abstract, meta-theoretical 
level). Rescher’s framework provides a plausible general characterisation of what a 
process is and criteria for identifying a philosophical process theory, which are 
specific enough to pick out a range of relevant historical and contemporary 
philosophical positions, but broad enough to encompass diversity 2 . It is my 
contention that this basic framework can be usefully extended in order to develop a 
better understanding of EPT. 
                                                          
2
 Several of Rescher’s key technical concepts are open to multiple interpretations and may be used 
differently in different strands of the literature. Emergence is one such concept that I shall return to 
explicitly in Part II. 
  
 5 
Desiderata for an Economic Process Theory 
It is clear that Rescher’s definition of the scope of process philosophy is directed at a 
philosophical audience. More specifically, points 3 and 4 are not central elements of 
the social scientific project. It is not generally deemed to be the job of economists to 
determine which ontological categories are ‘most fundamental’ (Proposition 3) in 
any general sense of the phrase. Similarly, the classical philosophical puzzles relating 
to God’s existence, personal identity and materialism (Proposition 4), though they 
may have an impact on the practice of economics, are not the primary focus of the 
discipline. This leaves propositions 1, 2 and 5, from which we can construct a 
tentative list of desiderata for an EPT. 
 Following Rescher, I have already stipulated that processes must have both a 
phased structure and a temporal dimension, which implies that both the passage of 
time and the recognition of change between the different phases (Proposition 1) 
must be basic ontological categories within an EPT. That process is an analytical 
category of ontological description (Proposition 2) is an obvious criterion to adopt in 
the philosophical literature, but it may place the bar too high when attempting to 
understand contributions to economics. Very few economic theorists make their 
ontological assumptions explicit in a way that would allow them to be easily 
identified – it is usually up to methodologists and historians of thought to tease out 
the implicit message3. Proposition (5), which emphasises the ontological centrality of 
the categories of contingency, emergence, novelty, and creativity is much more apt 
for the analysis of economic theory, since these categories are more likely to be 
explicitly put to use in theory construction rather than the more abstract conception 
of process.  
 Selectively recombining Rescher’s ideas, we arrive at the following list of four 
desiderata that we would expect an EPT to possess: 
1. An EPT must recognise the ontological and explanatory importance of the 
passage of time. 
2. An EPT must recognise the ontological and explanatory importance of the 
difference between successive and different phases in a temporal process. 
3. Though it may not be explicitly discussed, the notion of process should be a 
basic (though perhaps implicit) presupposition of an EPT. 
4. An EPT should be able to accommodate the ontological categories of 
contingency, emergence, novelty and creativity whilst maintaining its 
principal explanatory ambition. 
                                                          
3
 This type of work is a growing part of the methodology and history of though literature which has 
been referred to as scientific ontology or internal metaphysics by some commentators (Lawson 2014). 
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These elements will allow us to identify the common themes and characteristics that 
unify economic process theorists, whilst leaving space for both theoretical diversity 
and the influence of schools of thought on the history of economic ideas. 
 The second part of this paper will extend my analysis to an author who is 
notoriously difficult to categorise: George Shackle. I have deliberately chosen 
Shackle as a focus because his contribution stands out both for its originality and for 
the difficulty that interpreters of his work have faced in attempting to classify him 
within the canon of one or other heterodox school of thought. My contention will be 
that Shackle is an economic process theorist, which explains his affinities with post 
Keynesianism, Austrian Economics and Institutionalism and his relative neglect in 
both heterodox and mainstream methodological debates. This will allow me to show 
(in the third part of the paper) how treating Shackle’s approach as an EPT suggests 
new responses to two seemingly powerful critiques of his work. 
 
Part II 
Shackle’s Contribution 
Shackle is an unusual figure in the history of 20th century economics. He was a 
talented and prolific writer who developed a heterodox approach to decision making 
under uncertainty informed by psychology and philosophy. He was a student of 
Hayek and a follower of Keynes, who was difficult to classify as either post Keynesian, 
or Austrian, though he had affinities with both schools of thought. He was mainly 
concerned with macroeconomic problems, but his research focussed on the 
psychology of individual choice under uncertainty in order to solve them. And he was 
sophisticated philosophical thinker who has had limited impact on the philosophy of 
economics. These tensions have been duly noted by historians of economic thought, 
who have recognised Shackle’s contribution to a variety of intellectual debates 
whilst noting his unusual status within the profession (Harcourt 1981; Harcourt and 
Sardoni 2000). 
 The first part of Shackle’s career culminated in research (Shackle 1949, 1955, 
1961) that responded to a question posed by Keynes in his analysis of investment 
decisions: how do we make ‘risky’ decisions and ‘save face as rational men’? For 
Shackle, the key to understanding such decisions was the recognition that they were 
based on expectation rather than established fact, and that theorising about the 
future was qualitatively different from describing past occurrences. Following Frank 
Knight, Shackle rejected the concept of probabilistic risk advocated by mainstream 
theorists and outlined a theory of investment decision that eschewed numerical 
probabilities in favour of a subjectivist, psychologically grounded explanation. 
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 Stripped of its technical form, his theory contains three basic elements. First 
Shackle claims that an investor must simplify a choice between alternative ventures 
by determining two focus outcomes (focus gain and focus loss): one representing 
what he ‘stands to gain’ and the other representing what he ‘stands to lose’. These 
are judged on the basis of their desirability, which can be measured. However, the 
desirability of an outcome does not affect the likelihood of its occurrence, hence 
Shackle introduces the dual notions of possibility and surprise. His concept of 
‘possibleness’ is a second subjective variable, based on the specific experience and 
intuitions of the investor, it determines the range of outcomes that are considered in 
the decision making procedure. However, possibleness is categorical: an outcome is 
either deemed to be possible or not. Shackle therefore proposes the subjective 
feeling of ‘potential surprise’ as a proxy measure that allows investors to decide 
between competing ventures at the moment of decision. He sums his position up as 
follows: 
“The act of decision is a fusing of judgments of different kinds, and these judgments 
in effect are made all at once in that moment and have their mutually relevant 
existence in that moment. The chooser of action wishes to fix upon the best and 
worst imagined outcome of each action that are possible enough: the best that is 
possible enough to be worth hoping for, and the worst that is too possible to be 
dismissed.” (Shackle 1988: 5) 
 It is important to note that, despite the use of deductive modelling 
techniques and an evident desire to formulate the theory in terms amenable to a 
dialogue with the mainstream, Shackle’s position was perceived to be radical from 
the start. Its radicalism is emphasised both by his rejection of probabilistic reasoning 
and by his emphasis on understanding the processes underlying decision making 
rather than simply focussing on predicting outcomes (Watkins 1955: 72).   
 Shackle’s later research is more directly engaged with working on the 
philosophical themes that were implicit in his contribution to decision theory. An 
important part of this work involved a discussion of ‘Keynesian Kaleidics’ (Shackle 
1974; 1983), which drew on an original reading of Keynes through his 1937 QJE 
article and Hugh Townshend’s interpretation of the General Theory. Much of what 
Shackle said in the seventies about the importance of radical uncertainty and the 
instability of expectations in Keynes has gained wide acceptance amongst heterodox 
(and particularly post Keynesian) economists and I shall therefore not develop it 
here.  
 More controversially, however, Shackle strayed into overtly philosophical 
territory in his analysis of the nature of time, imagination and choice (Shackle 1959; 
1972; 1988). Writing in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Shackle 
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contrasted the implicit views of time deployed by mathematicians or historians with 
the individual, experiential perception of time. According to Shackle, the 
mathematical conception of time involves a necessary compression of the 
experience of the passage of time, which is part of representing a physical process 
through equations. Taking the example of the movement of particles in classical 
dynamics, he shows that, in order to be able to interpret differential equations as 
representing a physical process occurring over time, the mathematician must see the 
process as a snapshot. He must cast himself as an observer of this snapshot located 
outside the flow of events that characterises the real process being described. 
However, there is an alternative, phenomenological, view of time, which sees it as a 
subjective experience: 
‘From this inside view which each of us has in the very act of living, the time of our 
actual psychic experience is but a moment, utterly solitary in its isolation from all 
other moments. It is what I would like to call the solitary present or the moment-in-
being… Time from the inside is the time in which we think, time from the outside is 
the time about which we think.’ (Shackle 1958: 286) 
According to Shackle, therefore the passage of time is thus both an external 
movement along a calendar and an internal movement from one moment to 
another.  
 But, Shackle’s theory also accommodates the human ability to imagine the 
future or ‘create images unaided by outside stimulus, and to label them with dates 
other than the actual date at which such images are created’ (1958: 288). This type 
of imagining is central to Shackle’s economic theory, in the sense that it is from the 
operation of the (constrained) imagination that an individual forms their subjective 
image of the future. The latter is made up of forward-looking expectations and 
anticipations. Expectations of alternative possible futures are constrained by the 
agents’ beliefs about the natural order and human abilities. Anticipations are 
similarly constrained, but are additionally limited by the imagination of a specific set 
of outcomes in those future states, to which the individual has some sort of 
commitment (Shackle 1958: 288-289). 
 Shackle’s conception of choice as origination builds on these two ideas since 
choices are always made by imaginative agents at specific moments employing the 
inside view of time: 
‘A non-determinist view of history requires us to suppose that a choice can be in 
some respects exempt from governance by antecedent thought or contemporary 
circumstance, that a choice can be in some respects an uncaused cause.’ (Shackle 
1988: 2) 
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His commitment to the reality of such choices is not based on an a priori assumption 
of human freedom (though it is open to those who would make such an assumption). 
Instead, every choice shifts the bounds of possibility by committing the chooser to 
one imagined sequel out of many alternatives. Since there is no way of putting an 
objective limit on those imagined sequels, nor a rational selection mechanism within 
the bounds of those that are subjectively deemed to be possible, choices are by 
definition unpredictable. Thus for Shackle, choices are creative acts that have the 
potential to add novelty to the chooser’s environment: they make the future 
‘unknowable’, or in more conventional terms uncertain. 
Shackle as an Economic Process Theorist 
It remains to draw the links between these basic elements of Shackle’s conception of 
economic activity and my proposed desiderata for an Economic Process Theory. 
Since Shackle did not employ an evolutionary framework, or engage in any 
substantive way with the (old) institutionalist literature, he lacks clear processual 
credentials. The links between institutionalism, pragmatism and evolutionary 
thinking are both explicit in the original sources and well articulated in the secondary 
literature. Conversely, there have been very few attempts to link Shackle’s work to 
processual themes in the methodological literature, with a few notable exceptions 
(Lachmann 1976, Parsons 1993; Runde 1997; Hodgson 2000; Augier 2001)4.  
 Reintroducing my list of four desiderata will show that – given a more precise 
interpretation of what an EPT is – Shackle can be seen as defending a processual 
perspective. My first claim is that an EPT must recognise the ontological and 
explanatory importance of the passage of time. Shackle’s detailed philosophical 
reflection on the nature of time starting in 1954 and ranging through to work 
collected and edited by Frowen in 1988, towards the end of his life, provides ample 
evidence of the centrality of the concept in his corpus. To my knowledge, no other 
economist has published an article on the nature of time in a leading philosophy 
journal. Apart from his aforementioned critique of the mathematical conception of 
compressed time as employed by economists, Shackle came to defend an ontology 
of time that saw its essence as something ‘whose existence involves its continuous 
movement and continuous evolution’ (Shackle 1958: 14). And as I have already 
noted, it would not be possible to make sense of his theory of imagination and 
                                                          
4 An obvious strategy would be to trace concrete processual credentials through references to 
process philosophy within Shackle’s work. Unfortunately, this strategy is hampered by the paucity of 
citations in his publications. One co-edited volume (Carter et al. 1954) does contain several responses 
to Shackle’s work by philosophers. John Watkins (who contributed to the volume and reviewed him 
favourably in 1955), W.B. Gallie and Daniel O’Connor were all analytic philosophers working within 
the dominant paradigm. There is little evidence of their influence on Shackle’s philosophical 
development within this volume, or indeed elsewhere. 
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choice without these ontological assumptions (see also Augier 2001: 197-198)5. Thus, 
to the extent that Shackle’s theory of decision-making is intended as an explanation 
of the investment decision and as a basis for a realistic theory of entrepreneurial 
behaviour, the idea of the passage of time has clear explanatory cachet. 
 Secondly, I proposed that an EPT must recognise the ontological and 
explanatory importance of the difference between successive and different phases 
in a temporal process. This idea is closely linked to the first, though not identical. The 
best way to show the importance of this element of temporality for Shackle is to 
consider his critique of general equilibrium. Even though mainstream economists 
can make reference to the passage of time and refer to successive phases (for 
example between periods or between the long and the short run), this is only a 
superficial appearance. Shackle argues that modelling general equilibrium requires 
the pre-reconciliation of all choices, which in turns requires those choices to be 
simultaneous6. The whole system therefore leaves out the phase-like structure of 
temporal experience to what Shackle considered to be disastrous effect: 
“The expressions an action, a course of action, a plan, an enterprise, a policy, are all 
in varying degrees synonymous. Some of them distinctly and obviously imply the 
occupation of a stretch of the calendar. But it is the unity or coherence, the 
organicity of the action or the plan that matters. Need we be concerned at having to 
suppose the ‘successive’ parts of the action or the plan to be telescoped? Does the 
dimension of lapse of time matter? The timeless system of choices must ignore the 
need for lapse of time. Is there something about the time-squeezed economy that 
need worry us?’ (Shackle 1988: 11). 
According to Shackle, the answer to this question is a resounding ‘yes’. What is 
missing from the time squeezed economy is real choice. Real choices are discrete, or 
as Shackle likes to call them ‘quantum shifts’, which clearly differentiate between 
one phase and the next. 
 My third desideratum was that the notion of process should be a basic, 
though perhaps implicit, presupposition of the theory. Here the lack of an 
overarching evolutionary framework as would be found in, say, the work of 
Thorstein Veblen, prevents a straightforward answer. Nevertheless, there is ample 
                                                          
5 Several commentators have hinted at a more direct and explicit connection between Shackle’s 
treatment of time and process philosophy through the work of Henri Bergson (Ackerman 1958; 
Lachmann 1976, Ford 1993). Bergson was known to have influenced both Ludwig von Mises and 
Joseph Schumpeter, though Shackle does not cite him and denied any intellectual influence. 
6
 Contemporary economists attacked general equilibrium on the basis of a catalogue of analytical 
shortcomings (e.g. Kaldor 1972; 1986), but none of them took quite as radical a line of critique as 
Shackle.  
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evidence to suggest that the notion of the economy as an unfolding process rather 
than a static object is driving Shackle’s analysis. Remember that a process involves at 
least three elements: distinct phases, a temporal dimension and a generic structure 
in virtue of which any concrete process is shaped or formatted. The first two 
elements are discussed in detail above, whilst the notion of generic structure is 
developed in Shackle’s later work.  
 The word ‘process’ does not appear in the subject indices of Shackle’s major 
philosophically inspired books (Shackle 1972; 1988), but processual themes are 
central to his argument. In particular, the extended discussion of diachronicity in 
Epistemics and Economics clearly demonstrates his abandonment of substance 
metaphysics in favour of a processual ontology. The presence of a generic structure 
within the processes he describes, Shackle argues, is presupposed by the success of 
our practical and scientific endeavours. More specifically, in the context of a 
discussion of how we can accumulate knowledge in and of a dynamic system, 
Shackle says: 
‘Theory in many disciplines is of course the study of temporal sequence, the study of 
transformations. The elemental basis of systematic knowledge by experience is that 
things of certain kinds happen in a fixed configuration which can be described only 
by saying that two specified phenomena were concomitant, or else that they were 
sequential. Induction may be insecurely based in logic, but it is the means of our 
learning to cope with practical life.’ (1972: 285) 
He goes on to define explanation in science as the ex-post discovery of what he calls 
‘traces’ that connect unexpected present outcomes to a generic structure that 
shaped the present but was either poorly identified or unidentified in the past. He 
links this conception of explanation to our ability to make conditional scientific 
predictions and to produce practically useful technology. This account of generic 
structure is only superficially hampered by Shackle’s radical subjectivism: he speaks 
of traces because his philosophical framework lacks the tools to describe an unseen 
yet causally efficacious structure that underpins experience (see Runde 1997: 236-
240). Nevertheless his framework presupposes the existence of some such structure 
to account for the possibility of scientific knowledge and its accumulation over time. 
 My final proposal was that an EPT should be able to accommodate the 
categories of contingency, emergence, novelty and creativity. Novelty and creativity 
were key ideas for Shackle throughout his career and their possibility (indeed their 
inevitability) is at the root of his conception of choice and his kaleidic interpretation 
of the economic system. Augier (2001) has written extensively on this topic, whilst 
connecting Shackle’s ideas to the phenomenological perspective of the sociologist 
Alfred Schutz, and Hodgson (2000: 55-57) makes similar claims on Shackle’s behalf. 
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Contingency is also unproblematic in the sense that the whole notion of pre-
reconciliation of choices that Shackle argues against is an attempt to eliminate 
contingency from the analytical framework of economics. Indeed the notion of the 
contingent circumstances of the individual chooser is the key to understanding her 
mindscape and hence being able to reconstruct the subjective variables of 
possibleness and surprise that underpin Shackle’s decision theory.  
 Emergence, on the other hand, poses more of an interpretive puzzle. The 
conventional notion of emergence as the appearance of a new (usually macroscopic) 
property from the interaction of the elements of a (usually microscopic) substratum 
organised in a particular way, is not explicitly articulated in Shackle’s writings. 
Explicit talk of emergence in the work of economists (including evolutionary and 
institutionalist authors) is unusual, so the absence of an account is not surprising. 
Still, given the lack of textual evidence, it is difficult to claim that Shackle had any 
sort of clear commitment to the existence of emergent properties at the institutional 
or supra-individual level.   
 This gap should not be taken to suggest that emergent properties are 
completely absent from Shackle’s framework. Geoff Hodgson (2000: 60-61) has 
speculated that the language of institutions as emergent properties could be 
compatible with Shackle’s perspective and would have made his admiration of 
Keynes easier to understand in methodological terms. Jochen Runde is more critical 
when he notes the absence of an explicit account of structures (or generative 
mechanisms) in Shackle’s theory. However, he too identifies that Shackle’s account 
of the natural order underpinning subjective experience requires such structures. He 
does so by quoting another passage from the opening pages of Epistemics and 
Economics: 
‘The occurrence, over and over again of similar objects or events establishes a class 
of objects or events, a concept. Such concepts themselves can then form the 
building blocks of more complex and inclusive configurations. Science tells us what 
to count on, what to rely on. But in doing so it merely imitates and refines the 
process by which we build, each of us for himself, the homely technology of 
everyday living. The means of its doing so is the power of survival and reappearance 
of types of configuration.’ (author’s emphasis, Shackle 1972: 6-7) 
The last sentence is key, because here Shackle clearly attributes the existence and 
success of the ‘homely technology of everyday living’ to the persistence of what he 
calls ‘configurations’: nothing other than the emergent structures of the natural 
world. 
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 It cannot be denied that Shackle’s radical subjectivism and his systematic 
focus on the psychology of choosers favours an individualistic ontology where 
emergent properties are fixed at the level of what philosophers would call 
irreducible mental states7. This may be seen as problematic by those seeking to 
interpret him as a process theorist since for many process philosophers, the 
appearance of irreducible emergent properties from complex interactions in a 
physical or organic substratum is an important motivation for the adoption of 
process philosophy. Yet, we have already seen in the passage above that the 
emergence of natural mechanisms of this sort is consistent with Shackle’s 
perspective. The problem facing Shackle is not the absence of emergent properties 
from his account, but the glaring absence of social emergent properties. 
 Here again, placing Shackle’s account in the context of process philosophy is 
instructive. Whilst process philosophers agree about the centrality of the category of 
emergence, there is no widespread agreement on which emergent properties 
actually exist. The philosopher-psychologist Mark Bickhard, for example, seeks to 
anchor his sophisticated account of social life as process in an ontology of persons 
(individuals with irreducibly social characteristics), who construct the social realm 
first through what he calls ‘situation conventions’ and then through ‘institutionalised 
conventions’ (Bickhard, 2004). His passage from individuals with non-idealised 
cognitive and social capacities to conventions mirrors Shackle’s reconstruction of 
Keynes’s General Theory. The key point to take from Bickhard’s discussion, however, 
is that recognising the thought and creativity of individuals as persons (rather than 
organic automata or machines) necessarily involves a commitment to emergence at 
least at the level of the individual agent (Bickhard 2004: 111-2). This last claim is 
entirely consistent with Shackle’s approach to choice as origination, in which 
decisions cannot be predicted from antecedent conditions and must be treated as 
created ex-nihilo. 
 Thus, our discussion of Shackle’s contribution to economic theory has 
highlighted the centrality of the concepts of time and uncertainty in his analytical 
framework and their implications for his theory of choice and the kaleidic nature of 
the economy as a whole. When juxtaposed with the four desiderata for an EPT, 
Shackle’s work was found to be consistent with all of them, though his neglect of 
social emergent properties leads to some tension with more conventional process 
theories. The final part of this paper will address the lukewarm reception of 
Shackle’s work amongst methodologists and heterodox economists more generally. 
                                                          
7
 It is implausible that Shackle adhered to the ontological, methodological and normative variants of 
methodological individualism. Yet all of these have, at some point, been proposed as centrally 
important to economics.  
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My conclusion will be that many of the alleged failings of his approach are linked to 
the fact that his contribution is an EPT. 
 
Part III 
Analytical nihilism and the impossibility of social order 
It would be an exaggeration to say that Shackle has been dismissed by recent 
heterodox research, but he certainly does not get the attention that some historians 
of thought think he deserves. Indeed, his early career was characterised by academic 
success and attention from leading figures from cognate disciplines (see e.g. Watkins 
1955). However, as the mainstream of the discipline of economics moved away from 
his interests and his research turned to more abstract philosophical topics, the tide 
turned against him. His major work in economic philosophy (Shackle 1972) was 
reviewed in two leading philosophy journals, but both reviewers were scathing in 
their remarks and pointed to the ultimate futility of his intellectual project (Newman 
1973; Boland 1974). There are two related strands to the critique of Shackle’s work, 
both of which claim to identify serious limitations in it. The first and most common 
critical reaction has been to describe Shackle as ‘analytically nihilistic’ (Coddington, 
1983: 61)8. The second is deeper and more nuanced; it sees Shackle’s emphasis on 
uncertainty and creativity as antithetical to any conception of social order and 
therefore inconsistent with the explanatory, predictive and policy ambitions of 
economics. 
 Analytical nihilism is a serious charge to bring against an economic theorist, 
since, taken at face value, it amounts to the claim that theorising is impossible and 
hence that his intellectual project is self-defeating.  However, once Coddington’s 
allegation of analytical nihilism is unpacked, it becomes clear that it cannot be 
sustained in Shackle’s case. Rather than demonstrating that Shackle’s project is self-
defeating, Coddington merely noted Shackle’s recognition and articulation of 
intractable theoretical problems that pose definite limits on the scope of economic 
analysis. In this case, radical critique is misinterpreted as analytical nihilism because 
of its destructive effects on the corpus of incumbent theory. As Stephen Parsons 
(1993) convincingly explains, drawing on numerous examples from nihilistic 
philosophy and the history of economic thought, this is neither nihilistic nor unusual 
in economics.  
                                                          
8
 The allegation of nihlism was almost certainly aided by a misinterpretation of something Shackle 
said when discussing the later works of Keynes (Shackle 1983). 
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 However nihilism as a position in modern economic methodology can be re-
formulated in a more restricted manner. Warren Samuels has suggested that it 
consists of a commitment to five basic ideas: free will; subjectivism; the belief that 
human decisions partially construct social reality; radical uncertainty; and diffidence 
about policy recommendations (Samuels 1993: 237). This definition, which Samuels 
himself endorses, is clearly also applicable to Shackle’s work. Rather than denying 
the possibility of theory, however, it denies the possibility of a certain type of theory 
and proposes the foundations of an alternative. Samuels’ nihilism is only nihilistic in 
the sense that it rejects the received wisdom of the discipline from which it sprung – 
it cannot be seen as a denial of the possibility of theory. 
 Why, then, did the allegation survive and even persist in the economic 
literature? Sociological factors may have played a role: accusing an intellectual 
opponent of nihilism is a quick and potentially effective way of dismissing his ideas 
and avoiding the need to respond to his critique.  But this is merely speculation and 
it cannot explain both Shackle’s and Samuels’ flirtation with the nihilistic label. A 
more promising way of interpreting both the allegation of nihilism and the potential 
attraction of the label is to place it in the context of process theory. 
 The key to this idea is that the objectives of an EPT are fundamentally 
different from those of a substance metaphysics-inspired theory. First, the 
theoretical terms of an EPT refer to unstable targets, not settled entities, and they 
tend to be understood in terms of functional criteria rather than identity conditions. 
Second (as process philosophers have long argued), the language of Western science 
is poorly equipped to analyse processual phenomena. The dominance of the 
substance ideal during the period when our scientific vocabulary and concepts were 
developed created a powerful block to the development of process theories in 
science (Rescher 1996: 83-103).  
 Thus, the battle to establish an EPT is both an argument for the adoption of 
an alternative social ontology and an attempt to develop a new language for 
describing economic phenomena. The creation of a new jargon, however, 
immediately opens the inventor (in this case Shackle) to accusations of obfuscation 
and, potentially, of analytical nihilism.  As one philosophical critic clearly 
demonstrates:  
‘Behind this [Shackle’s theory] lies the plea to view all this in a dynamic setting, since 
akin to thinkers like Bergson, rational de-humanizing science must satisfy 
phenomena which, by nature, are always in process and transformation. A view of 
this order clearly constitutes a good antidote to much of the research which goes on 
in the social sciences today, However, it remains an unfortunate point that romantic 
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inspiration alone will not improve our understanding of the many complexities of a 
dynamic economic society.’ (Newman 1973: 412) 
Here Shackle’s contribution is dismissed as ‘romantic inspiration’ precisely because it 
does not accord with the reviewer’s pre-conceived ideas of how a theory can bear 
empirical fruit in accordance with the Popperian framework that dominated the 
philosophy of economics at the time. The implication is clear: choosing an EPT over 
an impoverished mainstream theory is nevertheless irresponsible because it is 
destructive of the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Since the language and 
epistemic objectives of an EPT are different from the mainstream, the conclusion of 
analytical nihilism follows readily from this argument. 
 A second, related, reason why Shackle’s work has been dismissed by some 
and ignored by others is his apparent lack of a systematic account of social order. 
There are at least two features of this critique which are worth considering 
separately. First, Shackle’s commitment to radical subjectivism leaves him open to 
the perceived threat of solipsism. Second, his kaleidic conception of the economy 
eviscerates the possibility of rationally predicting future states of affairs and thus 
robs economics of its pretensions as a policy science. 
 Solipsism is the philosophical doctrine that only the existence of one’s own 
mind can be established with any certainty because knowledge of a world beyond its 
limits is inherently dubitable and subject to philosophical challenge. If subjectivism 
describes the position that economics must always start from people’s subjective 
interpretation of their situation, radical subjectivism can be defined as the further 
claim that subjectivism should be extended so that it ‘embraces not just people’s 
choice of means but also the creation of the goals they strive to achieve and the 
expectations that inform their choice of goals’ (Lewis 2011: 188). Discussing radical 
subjectivism in the work of Ludwig Lachmann, Paul Lewis explains how the 
radicalism of this approach renders the very idea of coordinated expectations 
problematic and was thus interpreted as anti-theoretical by critics. If an individual 
economic agent cannot rationally calculate the probable future behaviour of his 
fellows, then he will not be able to form expectations of future states of affairs and 
will remain paralysed. Thus, in the hands of economists, the inability to extend 
secure knowledge (including foreknowledge of the behaviour of others) beyond the 
limits of an individual mind is not just solipsistic in the philosophical sense; it also 
removes the possibility of an explanation for social order through coordinated 
individual actions. If Shackle’s position is indeed solipsistic, then he cannot hope to 
provide an account of economic coordination or social order. 
 I have noted in Part II that Shackle failed to systematically articulate an 
ontology of the objective natural realm and the intersubjective realm in which his 
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agents are located (Runde 1997; Hodgson 2000). Yet few (even philosophically-
minded) economists have explicitly engaged in such ontological reflection and 
Shackle gives numerous glimpses of how he would analyse both natural and 
intersubjective phenomena. I have already discussed his account of scientific 
progress in Epistemics and Economics, which gives an indication of his analysis of the 
natural world and the sciences that describe it. Shackle delves into the 
intersubjective realm of shared meanings and intentions in his discussion of price 
formation and investment decisions. The clearest example of this is his extended 
analysis of Keynes’ conception of convention, which suggests an acute awareness of 
the problems related to explaining intersubjective phenomena (Shackle 1967: 244-
247; Shackle 1972: 220-226). Thus the idea that Shackle’s radical subjectivism leads 
to solipsism seems somewhat far-fetched. 
 Here, once again, interpreting Shackle’s contribution as an EPT is helpful both 
to explain the critique and to suggest a response. Shackle’s principled focus on 
individual subjectivity raises the threat of solipsism if economic agents are 
conceptualised as social atoms as both the language and the methods of mainstream 
economics presuppose (Lawson 1997). The mind of a social atom is neatly 
circumscribed and its objectives are determined through internal calculations. It has 
no perception of the passage of time and no ability to change its circumstances. For 
social atoms of this sort, coordination and the resulting social order are hard won 
achievements and radical subjectivism presents a serious threat. The existence of 
heterogeneous individual goals that proliferate through creative activities makes 
prediction through individual, rational calculation impossible and the motor force of 
the economy is thus broken. But Shackle never accepted this account of agency, 
which is articulated in the language of substance metaphysics9. His processual 
conception of agency is much richer. It is based on the imagination of future 
scenarios rather than probabilistic calculation. It is open to the influence of non-
rational factors such as the news, public opinion or the prevailing social and cultural 
context. Perhaps most importantly, the mind of the individual chooser is not so 
tightly circumscribed in Shackle’s work, since he conceives of the mind as a 
changeable flow of experiences and environmental influences rather than a static 
and unchanging entity.  
                                                          
9 In the sense that it requires separate, well-defined entities, with settled identity conditions 
interacting in a deterministic manner to produce stable outcomes. Rescher describes the processual 
alternative thus: ‘For processists, this processual unity of the person has a distinctly social aspect. As 
it sees the matter, the self-definitional activity of persons proceeds in the context of interaction with 
one another’ (Rescher 1996: 110). 
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 The account of social order that Shackle derives from this conception of 
economic agency is revealed in his discussions of ‘Keynesian kaleidics’. And, though 
much of what he says is presented as an interpretation of Keynes, there can be no 
doubt that Shackle adopted and developed kaleidics himself. He defines kaleidic 
theory as: 
‘… the view that the expectations, which together with the drive of needs and 
ambitions make up the ‘springs of action’, are at all times so insubstantially founded 
upon data and so mutably suggested by the stream of ‘news’, that is, of counter-
expected or totally unthought-of events, that they can undergo complete 
transformation in an hour or even a moment, as the patterns of a kaleidoscope 
dissolve at a touch; the view that men are conscious of their essential and 
irremediable state of un-knowledge and that they usually suppress this awareness in 
the interest of avoiding a paralysis of action; but that from time to time they 
succumb to its abiding mockery and menace, and withdraw from the field.’ (Shackle 
1974: 42) 
Shackle emphasises disorder so that he can contrast his position with the equilibrium 
analysis presented by his mainstream opponents. The moments of rest afforded by a 
temporary balance in agents’ expectations, which are characteristic of the kaleidic 
economy, provide a glimpse of a social order in process. Even this kaleidic picture 
remains a mode of order; one where the impetus for both change and stability is 
generated within the process that produces it rather than imposed from the outside 
by a stable set of economic laws. 
 This brings us to the second perceived drawback of Shackle’s framework for 
the analysis of social order. Whether or not his position is solipsistic, critics have 
objected that the kaleidic theory undermines the potential of economics as a policy 
science. This objection – if one is to consider it an objection at all – has considerable 
merit, especially when understood against the backdrop of mainstream welfare 
economics and its policy implications. Indeed, Shackle made his ambivalence about 
the potential of traditional economic policy quite clear in an interview with the 
Austrian Economics Newsletter in which he stated: 
‘I think they [economists] should give up giving advice, except on the most hesitant, 
the most broad grounds. I think they should introduce an ethical element, a more 
than ethical element. If a man is asked whether public expenditure should be cut or 
not, he perhaps should say, "Well, if we cut it, we shall cause a great deal of misery; 
if we don't cut it, we don't know what the consequences will be, but we can't at least 
have this misery on our consciences". This sort of argument is not an economic 
argument, it's an argument with one's conscience. For very many years I've not 
believed in welfare economics as a scientific construction. My idea of welfare 
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economics is that you choose an administrator, a man with a conscience himself, and 
broad sympathy, with a generous mind and then you say, "Leave it to him!" I don't 
believe you can do any better. Those economists who are going to give advice, or 
who are going to be advisors either to government or to business, should have their 
training based in economic history, and they only need as much theory as you find 
up to the second year textbook.’ (Shackle 1983) 
 Scepticism about the policy potential of economics is traditionally thought of 
as an admission of failure – yet another hint of underlying nihilism. And Shackle’s 
understanding of policy-making is so entirely at odds with the mainstream 
perspective that it may seem to deny the possibility of social order. However, seen in 
the context of process theory, it is entirely justified. Note that Shackle’s scepticism in 
the above passage is directed towards the idea that we can accurately predict future 
states of affairs and precisely control their development with technical interventions. 
He does not challenge the belief – essential to economic policy – that we have a 
major stake in the construction of our economic environment. Rather he denies that 
it can be transformed into a technical game which eschews human, moral judgments. 
He conceives of economic ‘administrators’ as sympathetic and possessing generous 
minds, but, most importantly, he suggests that they should be modest, cautious and 
well acquainted with social and economic history.  This focus on history is typical of a 
processual perspective in that it attempts to find order in the generic structure of an 
unfolding process rather than the static description of states of affairs (Rescher 
1996: 118-120). 
 
Conclusion 
Drawing on the philosophical literature, I have constructed a more precise and 
generalisable conception of economic process theory. I outlined a set of general 
criteria, for the identification of economic process theories and tested those criteria 
by applying them to a problematic case. I proposed four desiderata: an emphasis on 
time, the recognition of distinct phases, a commitment to process, and the 
accommodation of contingency, emergence and creativity. Applying this new 
taxonomic framework to Shackle’s work, I then argued that his contribution clearly 
fits within the rubric of economic process theory. This conclusion is significant in that 
it suggests new ways to map connections between Shackle’s research and that of his 
precursors, contemporaries and followers in other heterodox schools of thought 
including Austrians and old institutionalists. Finally, I argued that reading Shackle as 
an economic process theorist allows us to see some of the standard criticisms of his 
work in a new light.  
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 Another important objective was to demonstrate that recognising any theory 
as an EPT has significant methodological and theoretical consequences. In 
responding to the charges of nihilism, solipsism and policy ambivalence, I have 
illustrated this point in the context of a specific and controversial case. By drawing 
links between economics and process philosophy, I have also shown that processual 
contributions to economics should not be limited to evolutionary or Darwinian 
theories and that the ontology of process has a broader remit within the social 
sciences. 
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